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ABSTRACT 
Misdemeanor courts have been infrequently studied, despite their central impor-
tance in law enforcement and social control. More than 9096 of all criminal cases 
are heard by misdemeanor courts, thereby providing most of the general public 
with its only view of the criminal process. 
Our study of four misdemeanor courts--Austin, Texas; Columbus, Ohio; Mankato, 
Minnesota; and Tacoma, Washington-is an attempt to compare the sentences 
imposed, the processes leading to sentencing, and the influence of the local 
political and economic environments surrounding the four courts. An eclectic 
m.ethodological approach was utilized, including collection of data from random 
samples of individual defendant case files, interviews with key court and political 
actors, and surveys of local citizen attitudes about crime and punishment in the 
lower courts. 
Fines are the most commonly-imposed sanctions in all four courts. Two-thirds or 
more of convicted defendants are required to pay some fine, ranging from a median 
of $150 in Austin to $50 in Mankato. Jail is used only very occasionally, except in 
Columbus where state law mandates incarceration for drunk driving. Generally, 
the two most critical factors affecting both the choice and severity of sanctions 
are the type of offense and the individual judge, but the relative influence of each 
varies from site to site. 
Reliance on fines and other forms of economic punishment (e.g., court costs) across 
all the courts is by no means accidental or coincidental. Rather, the revenue-
generating potential of misdemeanor courts and the prevalent modes of punishment 
appear substantially intertwined. Significant pressures for revenue-generation are 
documented in three of our sites. Judges are the most frequent targets of such 
pressure. Judges responded to these pressures differently in the several sites, 
usually depending upon the depth of the fiscal crisis facing local government. 
Judges more readily or eagerly acquiesced to pressures from county officials where 
local government (as in Tacoma) was severely and visibly strapped for funds. 
Substantial use of revenue-generating punishments and often minimal use of costly 
rehabilitation programs do not, however, square with local community opinion. 
Citizens indicated much greater preference for treatment programs, counseling, 
and volunteer community work for misdemeanor defendants than what is currently 
available or used by the courts. Also, disagreement about the use of jail surfaced 
on a case-by-case basis. Citizens prefer to jail drunk drivers, but courts (excepting 
Columbus) prefer to jail those convicted of assault or theft. 
Our findings suggest a need to re-think questions about the appropriate methods of 
court financing. If state financing of local courts is a trend, it is one fraught with 
new problems. Both the administration of justice and the financing of services 
have historically been local functions. A shift toward the state capitol would 
relieve local governments not only of fiscal pressures but also of many of the 
policy options associated with the administration of justice in municipal and county 
courts. 

PART I 
THE SETTING 
In this Executi '.'e Surpmary, we summarize the observations, findings and 
conclusions from our study, Beyond the Courtroom: A Comparative Analysis of 
Misdemeanor Sentencing.* Broadly conceived, this study is a comparative analysis 
• 
of the sentencing process in· four misdemeanor courts-Columbus, Ohio; Austin, 
Texas; Tacoma, Washington; and Mankato, Minnesota. We examine (1) the extent 
to which these courts differ in the types and severity of the sentences imposed on 
criminal defendants, and (2) the factors accounting for these differences. It is our 
central hypothesis that a theory of sentencing must take into account not only 
what goes on inside of these courtrooms, but also what occurs outside of them. 
This requires an understanding of both the internal dynamics of courthouse justice 
and external· factors beyond the courtroom which influence criminal court sen-
tencing. 
Comparative and case studies of felony court sentencing pr:actices have 
become commonplace in recent years (see, e.g., Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; 
Mather, 1979; Uhlman, 1979), yet lower criminal courts remain one of the least 
understood American judicial institutions (Alfini, 1980). Researchers seeking the 
glamorous, controversial, and timely topic have all too often avoided America's 
misdemeanor courts. While misdemeanor courts may be neither glamorous nor 
controversial, they continue to render decisions and impose sentences on a daily 
basis, which can and do significantly affect the lives of citizens. In fact, the 1967 
Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice 
estimates that more than 9096 of all criminal cases handled in this country are 
adjudicated by these lower courts. 
*Available, upon request, from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service 
Document Loan Program, Box 6000, Rockville, Maryland, 20850. See Appendix A 
for an outline of the full study. 
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Yet, there have been no systematic comparative studies of misdemeanor 
court sentencing practices. Recent case studies have increasingly come to stress 
the importance of the community environment. In a study of the New Haven, 
Connecticut lower court, for example, Feeley (1979) found that defendants 
received few jail terms and small fines. By contrast, Ryan ( 1980) found jail terms 
and large fines to be typical of the sentences imposed by lower courts in Columbus, 
Ohio. Ryan (1980:105) suggests that these differences in sentence severity cannot 
be attributed to factors internal to the court, but appear to flow from differences 
in the local political culture: 
Why outcomes are more punishing in Columbus than in New 
Haven cannot be answered definitively. But differences in 
the political culture and structure of the two com-
muni ties • • • clearly play a key role. The political culture 
of Columbus breeds a climate of severity. This is mani-
fested in the institutional domination of the police in the 
lower court, in the Columbus police department's orien-
tation to law enforcement rather than order maintenance, 
and in the community's expectations that traffic laws will 
be enforced. Moreover, judges in Columbus may be more 
responsive to community expectations of full enforcement 
and meaningful sanctions because they are elected locally 
and attached permanently to Columbus, unlike the rotating 
judges who serve the New Haven lower court. More precise 
linkages of the nexus between political culture and lower 
court outcomes must necessarily await comparative 
research. 
How distinctive these local environments are, and precisely what it is about 
them that accounts for such differences remain largely unanswered questions. In 
this study, we examine several elements of community env,ironment. We look at 
the ways in which our four communities vary with respect to resident attitudes 
toward crime and punishment. We also examine differences in the demographic 
structure of these communities. Finally, we examine the local economic climate, 
including the resources of local government, and the effect on the availability and 
use of sentencing alternatives. 
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We explore these issues by utilizing a mixture of quantitative data drawn 
from individual defendant case files, field interviews with court and political 
personnae, and responses to a mail survey of citizens in our four sites. In Part 1, 
we examine the extent to which these courts vary with respect to the types of 
cases brought before them, the characteristics of case processing, and the 
sanctioning alternatives available. Part II examines closely the sentencing 
practices of these four courts. We focus on the factors affecting the types of 
sentences imposed in the four courts as well as the severity of the sanctions 
imposed. In Part III, we move our analysis beyond the confines of the immediate 
courtroom. We survey citizen attitudes in the communities served by these courts 
and examine the economic environments of the counties within which these CO!Jrts 
are located. 
In our concluding chapter, we attempt to integrate our analysis within the 
courtroom with our view beyond the courtroom. We assess the implications of our 
findings for the future of misdemeanor courts. Finally, we offer some thoughts for 
future sentencing research and for questions of public policy and reforms. 
The Work of the Four Courts 
Jurisdiction of the courts. All of the four courts under study are lower courts 
that hear--in addition to some range of minor civil cases--a variety of misdemea-
nor and traffic offenses. The Blue Earth County Court in Mankato, Minnesota has 
original jurisdiction for misdemeanors throughout the county. The maximum 
sentence is 90 days in the county jail and/or a $500 fine. No other court in the 
county hears such cases. The Franklin County Municipal Court in Columbus, Ohio 
likewise has exclusive jurisdiction over misdemeanors throughout the county. 
Maximum sentence is one year incarceration in the county jail and/or a $1,000 fine. 
The Travis County Courts-at-Law in Austin, Texas have concurrent jurisdiction 
over misdemeanors throughout the county with other specialized and limited 
jurisdiction courts. Maximum sentence in the Travis County Courts-at-Law is one 
year incarceration and/or a $1,000 fine. Finally, Pierce County District Court No. 
1 in Tacoma, Washington has jurisdiction over misdemeanors in most parts of the 
county. Maximum sentence in the Pierce County District Court is six months 
incarceration and/or a $1,000 fine. 
Mix of offenses. All four courts hear a substantial number of drunk driving 
cases, ranging from 2596 in Mankato to 3596 in Austin. Everywhere, judges and 
attorneys consistently recognized the central place that drunk driving cases 
occupy. Lesser traffic offenses comprise a large share (nearly half) of the dockets 
in Mankato and Tacoma, but a much smaller share in the Columbus and Austin 
courts. Theft cases represent at least 10% of the docket in all of the courts except 
I 
Tacoma, where some theft cases are heard in other lower courts. Assault cases 
comprise a substantial share of the docket in Columbus, but not elsewhere. Eac;:h 
court hears a variety of other criminal offenses, including drug possession, alcohol 
violations, vandalism, prostitution, bad checks, and disorderly conduct, in propor-
tions reflective of local enforcem·ent policies and lifestyles. 
Court personnel. Three of the four courts have small benches. Three judges 
sit in Blue Earth County Court in Mankato, four judges in the Travis County 
Courts-at-Law in Austin, and five judges in the Pierce County District Court No. 1 
in Tacoma. The Franklin County Municipal Court in Columbus, by contrast, has 
thirteen judges. The prosecutor's offices for these courts vary from a large fifteen 
attorney office in Columbus to a one-person office in Mankato. Austin and Tacoma 
fall in between, each having about six or seven prosecuting attorneys working in 
the misdemeanor area. 
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The structure and utilization of defense attorney services vary sharply among 
the four courts. For indigent defendants, all of the courts except Austin provide 
public defender representation. The defender offices range from fifteen full-time 
attorneys in Columbus to three part-time attorneys in Mankato. Austin, by 
contrast, utilizes a system of assigned counsel. The size and influence of the 
private bars run the gamut from very !~mall in Mankato to very large in Austin. In 
Mankato, there are fewer than one-hundred attorneys in practice. Only a handful 
do a substantial amount of criminal work, and most of these depend upon civil 
cases to make a livelihood. Austin, by contrast, has a large number of attorneys, 
many of whom concentrate in the criminal area. The private bars of Columbus and 
Tacoma fall in-between these two extremes of size and degree of criminal 
specialization. Representation of misdemeanor defendants was nearly complete in 
Columbus and Austin (90% +),, substantial in Tacoma (.53%), but only ·occasional in 
Mankato (32%). 
All four courts have active probation departments which, in some combina-
tion, prepare presentence reports, supervise misdemeanants, and refer defendants 
in need of alcohol, drug, or other counseling to appropriate public or private 
agencies. The emphases differ, however, from community to community. In 
Austin, presentence report work has recently been cut back in misdemeanor cases 
in the name of economy. In Columbus, presentence investigation is still a major 
probation department activity. The Tacoma probation department is of a much 
smaller scale than Austin or Columbus, having about seven probation officers who 
primarily engage in "brokering" services rather than individualized supervision (see 
Grau, 1981). Finally, Mankato has the smallest probation department, with but two 
full-time officers who do primarily presentence investigations. 
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Defendants. Defendants in these four courts reflect a variety of citizens and 
walks of life; certainly, they are a much more heterogeneous sampling than in 
felony courts. Although predominantly male, defendants span the range of ages, 
occupations, and life-styles, particularly in traffic offenses. Citizens arrested for 
traffic offenses including drunk driving represent nearly all walks of life in the four 
communities. By contrast, defendants in minor criminal offenses such as assaults, 
disorderly conduct, public drunkenness, prostitution and the like represent more 
selective slices of the citizenry, in terms of age, economic stability and well-being, 
and lifestyle. 
Methods of case disposition. There are common as well as idiosyncratic 
elements across the four courts in their methods of case disposition. Three of the 
four courts-all except Tacoma-disposed of most of their misdemeanor cases by 
guilty plea, ranging from 5196 in Columbus to 6996 in Mankato. Likewise, all the 
courts except Tacoma reflect a low trial rate, and i!l all four courts the~ trial 
rate for the periods sampled does not exceed 296. Dismissals, too, play .a 
significant role in each of the courts, ranging from a low of 1596 in Mankato to a 
high of 3896 in Columbus. And bond forfeitures are used to dispose a small 
proportion ot (usually minor) cases in all the courts. Thus, there are some striking 
commonalities in case disposition practices across these courts. 
Nevertheless, the degree of plea negotiations preceding the entry of guilty 
pleas differs markedly from court to court. Active plea negotiations, including 
charge reductions, are frequent in Columbus and include defense attorney, prose-
cutor, and, sometimes, judge. Charge reductions are particularly common in drunk 
driving cases in Columbus, where the statute provides for a mandatory three-day 
jail term for defendants convicted of drunk driving (see Ryan, 1980). The presence 
of defense attorneys, whether public or private, also provides an atmosphere 
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conducive to plea negotiations in Columbus that contrasts with, say, Mankato. 
There, many fewer defendants are represented by counsel, and local prosecutors in 
Mankato have been adamant in their refusal to negotiate with unrepresented 
defendants. Tacoma is much like Columbus with resp~ct to frequent charge 
reductions, especially in drunk driving cases. In Austin, nearly every defendant is 
represented, yet few charge reductions appear in our case file data. Our 
interviews and observations suggest, however, that sentence bargaining--not charge 
bargaining--is the prevalent mode of plea negotiation activity, which typically 
takes place between prosecutor and defense attorney without judicial participation. 
Adjudication of guilt. In all four courts, the majority of cases that proceed 
beyond arraignment result in a conviction~ But this ranges from a low of 5896 in 
I 
Tacoma--where defendants were often acquitted in an abbreviated bench trial 
known as "reading on the record"--to a high of 8296 in Mankato, where dismissals 
are relatively infrequent. Only a slightly larger percentage (61 %) were convicted 
in Columbus, where dismissals are common in the numerous assault cases. Almost 
three-fourths (7296) of defendants were convicted in Austin. 
The conviction rates for these four courts also include bond forfeitures, 
which comprised anywhere from 496 to 996 of the total dispositions. Bond 
forfeitures usually occur where the defendant fails to appear for trial or sen-
tencing. The court, then, merely closes the case by calling for forfeiture of the 
bond (Feeley, 1979:139, refers to this as "a standard device for 'Pi3:Ying fines' in 
many of the nation's traffic courts"). But in Columbus, bond forfeitures also occur 
where the defendant is present. Here, it is used as a means of disposing cases upon 
agreement of both sides, analogous to plea bargaining (Ryan, 1980). 
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Differences in the practices that take place in arraignment court impact 
upon local conviction rates. In Austin, nearly every case proceeds beyond 
arraignment, due in large part to pressures fro,m a private bar actively seeking 
clients. By contrast, large numbers of defendants plead guilty to misdemeanor 
offenses at arraignment in the other three courts. Estimates run upwards of 5096 
in Tacoma, and as high as 75% in Mankato. Thus, it is likely that the conviction 
rates for the totality of misdemeanor eases differ somewhat, though not sharply, 
from our samples of post-arraignment cases in these courts. 
Available sanctions. There are generally a wide range of sanctions available 
to most misdemeanor courts, and these four misdemeanor courts are no exception. 
Unlike felony courts which hear mostly serious cases, the comparatively minor 
infractions that typically comprise the world of misdemeanor courts permit 
utilization of fines, jail terms, probation, community service restitution, victim 
restitution, and the imposition of court cos'ts. In addition, community treatment 
programs--for alcohol or drug abuse--and safe driver programs may also be utilized 
as "punishment" for the wayward. The combinations in which sanctions and 
treatment programs may be utilized provide further variety to misdemeanor court 
sentencing (Ryan, 1980). 
StiH, fines play a predominant role in the four courts we studied (Table 1). 
Fines, either by themselves (Mankato and Tacoma) or in combination with 
probation (Austin) or jail (Columbus and Austin), are the primary method of 
punishment. In all four courts, approximately two-thirds or more of all convicted 
defendants pay a fine of some amount. Jail is not too often utilized, particularly in 
Tacoma and Mankato where traffic offenses comprise nearly one-half the docket. 
Probation is extensively used in Austin, frequently used in Columbus (figures not 
available), but not often used in Mankato or Tacoma. Community service 
restitution is occasionally used in Mankato and Tacoma, increasingly in Austin, but 
not at all in Columbus. 
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Table 1 The Four Courts: Utilization of Sanctions 
Austin Columbus Mankato Tacoma 
Texas Ohio Minnesota Washington 
Probation 15.0% NA 5.6% 3.0% 
Jail 6.7 .5. 1 10.7 4.2 
Fine 6.7 .57.2 62.7 54.4 
Fine & Probation 49.0 NA 4.4 4.8 
Fine & Jail 22.2 29.6 2.0 3.2 
Other Combinations .4 4.8 2.1 
None of above 8.1 * 9.8** 28.3*** 
N**** ( 1,216) ( 1,281) (803) (565) 
*Includes fines and jail terms suspended in their entirety; possibly also probation 
sentences, for which data are unavailable. 
**Includes fines and jail terms suspended in their entirety, as well as community 
work and counseling/treatment programs. 
***Includes frequently high amounts of court costs imposed in lieu of fines, as well 
as community work. 
****Excludes convictions by bond forfeiture, where punishment is tantamount to 
a fine. 
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Summary 
That courts, including misdemeanor courts, vary across jurisdictions has by 
now become a commonplace empirical finding in the social science and criminal 
justice literatures. The four lower courts under study here, anC!f their communities, 
also vary across a range of environmental and organizational dimensions. Many of 
the differences in the courts are, in part, a function of differences in community 
size. Mankato ancf surrounding Blue Earth County are small in population, part of 
rural America. Thus, the low (serious) crime rate, substantial traffic docket, and 
handful of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys who do the work of the lower 
court are to be expected. Likewise, the populous, metropolitan character of 
Columbus and surrounding Franklin county contributes to a large, differentiated 
work force handling the more heterogeneous minor criminal docket of its lower 
court. Between these two extremes, the Tacoma and Austin courts share some 
features in common such as organizational scale. But the Tacoma court is really 
more like the court in Mankato and the Austin court is more like the court in 
Columbus, probably because the Austin population base is as highly urban as in 
Columbus, whereas the substantial rural flavor of the county surrounding the city 
of Tacoma parallels Mankato. 
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PART II 
SENTENCING: COURTROOM INFLUENCES 
The Choice of Sanctions 
Misdemeanor courts impose a range of sanctions upon convicted defendants. 
We brie'fly described some of the more frequent sanctions, such as fines, jail terms, 
and probation, in Part I of our study. In Part II, we analyze why one type of 
sanction is imposed instead of another. In particular, we measure quantitatively 
the influence of the type of offense, the judge before whom sentencing takes place, 
and a number of other case characteristics (e.g., presence of a defense attorney, 
mode of disposition, number of charges) on the choice of sanction. W'e then 
examine the severity of sanctions imposed. 
In exploring the basis for the choice of sanctions imposed upon convicted 
defendants, we confined our multivariate analysis to the three most prevalent 
types of sanctions--fine, jail, and probation--and their combinations. In all four 
courts, we found that defendants are pigeon-holed according to the offense with 
which they were charged. Drunk driving and traffic cases nearly always resuft in a 
fine, possibly along with jail or probation. By contrast, theft and other miscel-
laneous criminal offenses much less often result in a fine; more common is the use 
of jail or probation. The decision not to use a fine in many minor criminal cases 
may stem from a philosophy that such offenses are "too serious" to be treated 
merely with a fine, that offenders are in need of ongoing counseling or supervision, 
the practical realization that many defendants cannot afford to pay a fine, or some 
combination of these. The linking of sanctions with types of offenses is most 
pronounced in Austin. 
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The role of the individual judge varies much more sharply from one court to 
another. In Austin, where prosecutors and defense attorneys work out most details 
of sentencing, the judge appears to matter little. In Mankato, the individual judge 
matters little because the small, three-judge bench has consciously striven for 
internal consistency through mutual discussions. In Tacoma, where prosecutorial 
inexperience in trial courtrooms and negotiation sessions has encouraged active 
judicial scrutiny of plea bargains and sentences, differences amongst the court's 
judges have emerged. And in Columbus, where the court is populated by thirteen 
judges, different judicial philosophies about sentencing are an acknowledged and 
accepted state of affairs.* 
The Severity of Sanctions 
Determining the severity of a sentence becomes problematic when multiple 
sanctions are imposed or in comparing one type of sanction (e.g., fine) with another 
(e.g., jail). It is not readily clear, for example, whether a $300 fine or 3 days in jail 
is the more severe. Nor is it clear how severe a sentence that mixes six months 
probation with a $50 fine actually is. The units of measurement are not readily 
comparable, and there is no standard equation that can translate jail days into 
dollars. 
A number of researchers have addressed this thorny issue through some sort 
of scaling technique. The Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts (1972) 
introduced a severity scale (ranging from 0 to 50), as a way of comparing sentences 
across federal district courts. Subsequently, researchers adopted or modified that 
scale for felony court sentencing in the states (see, e.g., Uhlman, 1979). Feeley 
(1979), in his study of the New Haven lower criminal court, developed a five-point 
*For a fuller discussion of the choice of sanctions, see Ragona and Ryan (1983) 
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scale for sentence severity. Though suited to misdemeanor court dispositions and 
less arbitrary than the Administrative Office scale, Feeley's scale nevertheless 
discriminates fines only into categorie~ above and below $50. Also, the limited, 
ordinal character of his scale is not ideally suited to the regression analysis 
presented (Feeley, 1979:140). 
Given the limitations of J?fior research efforts, we have adopted the posture 
of analyzing the severity of sanctions individually (see also Ryan, 1980), with 
special attention to the widely varying amounts of fines in the courts studied. We 
also examine fine levels when combined with jail terms or probation, to determine 
whether the presence of additional sanctions enhances, ameliorates, or makes no 
difference in the severity of fine levels. Analyses are presented for all cases as 
well as for drunk driving cases separately. By focusing on drunk driving cases, we 
are able to control for the courts' widely varying dockets. The result is an in-depth 
look at the most prevalent, and probably the most serious, offense these four 
courts handle. 
Fine levels varied, in their central tendency and distributions, across the 
courts. Austin exhibited the most uniformly high fines (median = $150), followed 
by Columbus (median = $100). Fines in Mankato and Tacoma were typically lower, 
but there was a significant percentage of very high fines in Mankato. The 
composition of the courts' dockets was one major factor accounting for these 
differences. The substantial minor traffic caseload in Mankato and Tacoma 
partially accounted for the generally lower fines in these courts. 
The differential use of other sanctions was also a confounding factor. Fines 
in drunk driving cases in Columbus, for example, were relatively low compared 
with Mankato or Tacoma, but short jail terms were much more frequently imposed 
in these cases in Columbus (usually, by mandate of state law). Thus, it is difficult 
to conclude which (if any) of the four courts are tougher in drunk driving cases, let 
alone in the full range of cases that these courts handle. 
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Within the four courts, the sources of sanctions in fine levels paralleled those 
in the choice of sanctions. The type of case was a strong predictor of fines. In 
each court, DWI cases received the highest fines, often by a wide margin; in 
several courts, minor traffic cases received substantially the lowest fines. The 
individual judge, too, accounted for some differences in fine levels, notably in the 
Tacoma and Columbus courts. Thus, our findings with respect to sentence 
severity--at least, severity of fines-~are quite similar to those regarding the choice 
of sanctions. 
In our description and analysis of sentencing practices inside the courtroom, 
some of the variation within each of the four courts was explained by reference to 
the type of offense, secondarily to the individual sentencing judge, and marginally 
to an assortment of other case-related characteristics. This is so both for the 
choice of sanction and for its severity. 
Variations across the four courts were much less satisfactorily explained. 
The (differing) mix of each court's docket accounts for som.e of this variation, but 
much remains. Also, there are some striking similarities across the four courts, 
such as the prevalent use of fines, not readily accounted for by the types of factors 
w~ initially examined. In order to reach a comparative-based explanation, we 
moved beyond the courtroom to the communities -in which these courts are located. 
More particularly, we turned to the political and economic environments within 
which the lower courts sentence their defendants. This neglected arena of inquiry 
provides, we think, the basis for better understanding of why criminal courts do 
what they do. 
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PART III 
SENTENCING: COMMUNITY INFLUENCES 
In Part III of our study, we examined influences outside the courtroom to 
determine their effect on sentencing practices in each of the four courts. In 
particular, we surveyed citizen attitudes in the communities served by these courts 
and examined the varying economic environments of the counties within which 
these courts are located. 
Community Attitudes Toward Crime and Punishment 
In examining community attitudes toward crime and justice, we sought to 
discover the amount and types of congruence between local attitudes toward 
punishment and lower court sentences in these communi ties. Though surveys of 
public opinion on crime and punishment have been undertaken (see, e.g., Blumstein 
and Cohen, 1980; Thomas et al., 1976; Grindstaff, 1974; Rossi et al., 1974; Gibbons, 
196 9), this is one of the first instances where attitudes and court sentences from 
the ~local jurisdictions have been compared. 
We tapped community attitudes through a questionnaire mailed to a random 
sample of households in the four counties whose courts we have previously 
described. The response rate to the survey was remarkable by almost any 
standards. More than 50% of the households in three of the four communities 
responded--65% in Mankato, 55% in Columbus, 51% in Austin. Only in Tacoma did 
the response fall below half, 43%. These response rates compare well with surveys 
of judges and other public figures reported in the literature (see, e.g., Ryan et al., 
1980). Equally important, the respondents to our survey appear to be quite 
representative of their communities, based upon available Census Data. 
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Relatively little congruence between citizen attitudes and court sentences 
emerged from our data analysis. In absolute terms, the percentage of citizens who 
wou.ld fine, jail, or impose other sanctions upon convicted defendants in drunk 
driving, shoplifting, arid assault cases varies sharply from the sentences that the 
local court actually imposed. 
The strongest congruences between what courts do and what citizens think 
they should do occurs in the minor traffic offense area-speeding. 80% or more of 
all speeders are fined in each of the courts, and roughly 80% or more of citizens in 
each of the communi ties think speeders should be fined. Equally compelling, 
neither courts nor citizens believe in the frequent application of other sanctions in 
speeding cases. Strongest citizen support emerges for driver improvement 
programs, and it is these that are typically most likely to accompany fines in the 
few instances where courts employ more than one sanction. 
Significant disparities occur between courts and citizens in drunk driving 
cases. In general terms, citizens in our four communities would "throw the book" 
at drunk drivers, imposing upon them an array of sanctions. Courts, by contrast, 
are more selective in the actual use of sanctions. The sharpest differences appear 
in the utilization of fines and' jail terms. In all four courts, nearly every defendant 
receives some fine, but only about two-thirds or slightly fewer citizens would fine 
defendants. A significant minority of the populace in each community would, 
instead, suspen~ the license of convicted drunk drivers and send them to treatment 
programs. Correlatively, though, a significant minority--also about one-third--of 
each community would send drunk drivers to jail. Yet two of the courts--Mankato 
and Tacoma--rarely jail drunk drivers, and Austin does so only slightly more often. 
Only in Columbus does the percentage of defendants jailed for drunk driving 
roughly match the percentage of citizens who would send drunk drivers to jail. 
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Sharp differences also occur in shoplifting cases. In the most general terms, 
courts impose predominantly punitive sanctions-fine and jail--whereas the citi-
zenry favors much greater use of restitution to the victim (store), counseling for 
defendants, and community service work. The latter is used by the Mankato and 
Tacoma courts in theft cases but .flOt nearly with the frequency the citizenry 
favors, and community service is not at all utilized in theft cases in Columbus or 
Austin. Likewise, there is strong citizen support for counseling but little use by 
the courts. 
Disparities in assault cases generally parallel those in shoplifting cases. 
Except in Mankato, th~ courts fine defendants much more frequently than would 
the citizenry. Likewise, the courts generally jail defendants in assault cases more 
often than citizens would. Indeed, in one of the few statistically significant 
differences among community attitudes toward punishment, citizens in Mankato 
and Tacoma would send assault defendants to jail less often than citizens in 
Columbus and Austin. Yet it is precisely in Mankato and Tacoma where assault 
defendants are most likely to go to jail. 
In a more comparative vein, there is some evidence for a relationship 
between community attitudes and court sanctions. The most punitive citizenry 
appears to be Columbus, favoring more jail, less treatment programs, and less 
community service work. Likewise, the court most likely to send a defendant to 
jail is the Columbus one. By contrast, Mankato citizens seem to be the least 
supportive of jail and more supportive of treatment programs and community work. 
Similarly, the Mankato court employs treatment programs more often and jail less 
often than the other courts. Nevertheless, the number of cases in this comparison 
is small (n = 4), the differences are generally not large, and information about the 
use of sanctions (particularly, treatment programs) by courts is sometimes sketchy. 
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Furthermore, the aggregate preferences of citizens regarding the use of such 
sanctions as jail mask differences on a case-by-case basis that are not consistent 
with court use of these sanctions. 
In sum, there are both similarities and differences in court sentencing 
practices across the four courts that cannot be explained by the highly similar 
moral climates of the four communities. With the few exceptions already noted, 
citizens in Austin, Columbus, Mankato, and Tacoma generally feel much the same 
about which types of sanctions should be used in punishing misdemeanor defend-
ants. But lower courts appear to be responsive to factors other than public opinion. 
One such factor, we found, is the local economic environment. 
The State of the Fiscal Economy 
Criminal justice agencies rely on public funds to support their daily activi-
ties. In most states, this means primarily local (county) funding (Baar, 197.5). 
Thus, the availability of county funds, or more broadly, the strength of the local 
economic environment, becomes a potentially critical factor affecting local courts. 
We explore this nexus for Pierce county (Tacoma), Travis county (Austin), and Blue 
Earth county (Mankato),* in general terms and specifically with respect to 
sentencing. 
A severe fiscal crisis in the Pierce County government and the resultant 
pressures upon the court to generate revenue have significantly altered the 
sentencing practices of the Tacoma court. Caught between the simultaneous and 
conflicting demands of the state and county to raise revenues, the judiciary has 
altered the use of fines imposed. In an attempt to keep court-generated revenues 
within the county, fines have increasingly come to be replaced by "court costs" 
*Limited budgetary resources precluded the study of Columbus, Ohio's local economic 
environment. 
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which, unlike fines, remain entirely within the coffers of county government. 
These efforts, though, have served to further exacerbate the fiscal problems of the 
state. In so doing, they have indirectly contributed to deteriorating conditions 
within the county jail, for overcrowding in state correctional facilities has spHled 
over into aH local county jails. As a result, judges have begun to search for 
alternatives to jail, but the viability of alternatives is, in turn, reduced by county 
efforts to save money through personnel cutbacks, such as in probation. 
Fiscal constraints within Travis County have contributed to the problems 
faced by the county jail in Austin. Insufficient revenues to upgrade the jail have 
permitted serious deficiencies within the facility, thereby reducing the likelihood 
of jail sentence recommendations by a prosecutor's office which dominates the 
sentencing decision in Austin. Fiscal constraints have also altered probation in 
Travis County. The more costly "team concept" has given way to the more 
efficient--but perhaps less effective--individual approach to probation. 
Mankato courts have been the least affected by economic pressures. Blue 
Earth County has yet to feel the pinch of increasing fiscal constraints. Neverthe-
less, the state of Minnesota--like most states--is feeling the pinch, and so 
strategies for coping with such possibilities are beginning to emerge. As yet, such 
constraints have not significantly affected sentencing in Mankato. But the future 
of community service, probation, and some treatment programs are by no means 
secure in the Mankato court. 
Jails* 
Conditions within Travis County Jail in Austin were deplorable by almost any 
standard. A federal lawsuit was pending against the county because of these 
conditions, and a federal court had ruled in 197'4 that conditions within the jail 
*Limited budgetary resources precluded the study of Columbus, Ohio's local jails. 
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violated inmates' rights under the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution. Conditions within the jail had not improved 
markedly between 197 5 and 1982. At the time of our interviews, the County 
Commissioners were unavailable, but could be found in meetings regarding the 
continuing pressure by the federal courts to bring the Travis County Jail in line 
with constitutional rights. 
" 
The Pierce County Jail in Tacoma also faced problems. Though no law suits 
were pending agai_nst the county jail, overcrowded facilities resulted in inmates 
being released before the completion of their sentences. Some defendants 
sentenced to county jail were never admitted, due to overcrowding. 
By contrast, Blue Earth County Jail in Mankato was recognized as the finest 
facility in southern Minnesota. Overcrowding was no problem. Indeed, the facility 
was being used to house defendants sentenced to jail by courts in adjacent counties. 
Conditions within the Austin and Tacoma County jails had significant effects 
on court practices. Judges in both communities felt pres~ured to keep the jail 
populations down. In Austin, these pressures resulted in changes in custody and 
sentencing practices. Austin _defendants who might otherwise have been detained 
were being released on personal recognizance. And sentence recommendations 
made by the prosecutor's office were being modified in light of the jail situation. 
The impact of the changes in recommendations assumed all the more meaning in 
light of the Aus.tin judiciary's willingness to "rubber stamp" such recommendations. 
Tacoma judges were especially outspoken in their frustration with the 
conditions of the county jail. Judges felt their sentences were being overruled by 
executive actions, and they felt that their own credibility was being undermined in 
the eyes of the populace. Judges often modified jail sentences after some time had 
been served. Alternatives to incarceration were actively sought. One Tacoma 
judge noted, "rm looking for reasons not to send somebody to jail." 
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PART IV 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
We have presented a multi-faceted view of the sentencing process in four 
lower criminal courts, stretching ,from the shores of Tacoma, Washington to the 
streets of Columbus, Ohio. The question of why one defendant is sentenced in a 
particular way and another defendant differently is tackled first. We analyze 
sentencing practices within four courts, emphasizing the role of legal and, to a 
lesser extent, extra-legal factors. Then, we address why defendants as a whole are 
sentenced in particular ways in one community but differently in others. This leads 
to a structural, or macro-level, perspective, in which we examine the influence of 
the political and economic environments surrounding these four courts. This dual 
approach to studying sentencing yields a more satisfactory response to questions of 
both differences and similarities across the four lower courts. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Despite our ability to explain some, and occasionally much, of the variation 
in sentencing practices within these four courts, we share with Feeley (1979) some 
uneasiness about the completeness of a quantitative analysis of individual defen-
dant sentences. Feeley's response was to utilize a qualitative approach to describe 
the .erocess by which defendants came to be adjudicated and sentenced within the 
New Haven court. Our response, likewise, was to adopt primarily a qualitative 
approach but to direct our efforts beyond. the courtroom, to the larger community 
in which these courts function. There is ample evidence for the hypothesis that the 
community influences courts and the administration of justice (see, e.g., Baar, 
1975; Levin, 1977; Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Kritzer, 1979; Ryan et al., 1980), 
though little systematic testing has been done to date. 
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Finding little evidence for the influence of community attitudes about crime 
on lower court sentencing, we turned to the economic environment of the 
communities. Here, we struck the proverbial "pay dirt." Though our analysis is 
necessarily preliminary because it rests on interview data, not on actual numbers 
about the fiscal or budgetary picture, we believe the convergence of perceptions 
among a variety of court, court-related, and political actors lends credence to our 
interpretation~ and conclusions. 
Quantitative analyses revealed heavy reliance on the use of fines in all four 
courts. We believe this is no accident or coincidence. Nor do we see this 
phenomenon to be the result either of lofty penological considerations or a 
response to community values. Instead, we interpret the prevalent use of fines to 
reflect "economic realities"--that is, taking advantage of the opportunity to raise 
revenue for local (county) government. Fines can be seen as another local tax--in 
this instance, on minor illegal behavior. Local county boards impose this tax, 
which is politically acceptable to the populace because the amount is relatively 
small, the principle is "user-based," and the users constitute a small and un-
powerful portion of the total population. 
·Revenue generation takes place within quite different political and economic 
contexts, however. For one thing, the locales themselves vary in how dependent 
they are--or choose to be--on court-imposed fines, fees, and costs. Economic 
conditions, themselves, may not be comparable. Tacoma's county government, for 
example, was mired in a financial crisis far deeper than Austin or Mankato's. 
Correspondingly, expectations about the courts being "self-sustaining" in Tacoma 
contrasted with more modest visions of revenue-capability in Austin and Mankato. 
The source of pressures, however direct or subtle, also varied. The county board 
provided the (heavy) pressure in Tacoma and the (very mild) pressure in Mankato. 
But in Austin pressure came from the probation department, because the judicially-
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imposed monthly assessment of $15 accompanying probation went directly to the 
probation department rather than to the county general fund. 
Judicial responses to these pressures also differed from locale to locale. 
Judges in Tacoma acquiesced; indeed, they actively shuffled fines and court costs 
so as to improve the economic position of the county vis-a-vis the state. Austin 
judges, too, acquiesced to these pressures, albeit somewhat more reluctantly and 
less consistently. They did, for example, waive the probation fee on occasion for 
poor or nearly-indigent defendants, much to the chagrin of the probation depart-
ment. By contrast, Mankato judges consistently resisted pressures to raise 
additional revenue. They rejec~ed the suggestion of adopting court costs (Mankato 
currently imposes no court costs other than for partial reimbursement for use of 
the public defender's office). Perhaps because of this firm judicial opposition, 
Mankato was the only site where we found evidence that the targets of pressure 
extended beyond the court. There, some informants thought the police might be 
under some pressure to raise more revenue for the county, citing as evidence 
periodic blitzes of drunk driving arrests and traffic violations. 
Counties were not the only level of government strapped for funds. States, 
too, were far from fiscal security, further jeopardizing the economic viability of 
their local governments. Interestingly, states sometimes used local courts as 
sources of generating revenue for other, criminal justice-related programs. The 
state of Washington was particularly active in this regard. Assessments in five and 
ten dollar amounts were piled on top of defendant fines to help pay for statewide 
programs for traffic safety education and police training, among other things. In 
Texas, state-imposed assessments on fines in the local courts helped to raise the 
money to pay for state matches to federal grants awarded to local courts. In 
Minnesota, the legislature was debating, but had not yet passed, a measure similar 
to Washington-style assessments for police training and victim assistance pro-
\ 
grams. 
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The other side of revenue generation is cost control. Reducing expenditures 
has become a common theme at aU levels of government-federal, state and local--
and throughout the private economy. Courts, too, have not escaped from cost-
control techniques and budgetary cutbacks. Probation departments, in particular, 
have been the targets of personnel cutbacks. Austin and Tacoma have been hit 
particularly severely; in Austin, more than two dozen probation officers were laid 
off within an eighteen month period. 
The withdrawal of federal programs and funds has also affected these courts. 
The demise of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the 
emaciation of the Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) have been 
largely responsible for the diminution of federal government contributions. The 
Austin court was especially reliant on LEAA in a number of programmatic areas, 
including court administration, forensic services, and probation. One result was an 
elimination of the professionat'-level court administration position in favor of an 
upgrading of lower level, clerical personnel. For probation, the result was severe 
cutbacks in staff along with the elimination of the Austin court's innovative "team" 
concept. The Mankato and Tacoma courts have utilized CETA personnel to varying 
degrees. Their elimination in Mankato could threaten the court's currently-
extensive use of community service work, because in the past CET A personnel have 
administered that program. Perhaps surprisingly, Tacoma seems to have antici-
pated the decline of CET A by developing strategies to incorporate either the tasks 
they performed or the personnel themselves into the mainstream of the bureauc-
racy. Still, the severe pressures on local government in Tacoma could lead to 
further cutbacks in the Tacoma court support staff. 
Several implications for . misdemeanor court sentencing and the adminis-
tration of justice appear on the horizon, given the "economic realities" of these 
three communities. First, the treatment-rehabilitation ethic--so widely prevalent 
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in ·American penology--appear:s to be in jeopardy in the nation's lower criminal 
courts. At a time when money is tight, priori ties are being re-examined. Policy-
makers see little in the way of political constituencies behind rehabilitation 
programs, though the public itself is not un.iformly skeptical (based upon our survey 
responses). Furthermore, criminal jus.tice research has found les~ than resounding 
evidence of the success of rehabilitative approaches (see, e.g., Martinson, 1975). 
Probation, in particular, appears on the verge of being dismantled in mis,demeanor 
courts, and community service restitution may be crushed in its infancy. General 
treatment programs, such as for drug or alcohol-related offenses, may survive only 
' if user costs are greatly increased or if existing local welfare and human service 
bureaucracies absorb criminal justice system defendants. 
Secondly, the use of ja_il for convicted misdemeanants may become a luxury 
of the past. Except where state law mandates short-term incarceration (as 
increasingly appears to be the case with drunk drivers), the discretionary use of jail 
may be rare indeed. If our locales are at all representative, many local jails are 
teeming with felony defendants who either have been convicted and sentenced or 
are in custody awaiting trial. With serious crime on the increase and measures to 
limit bail opportunities widespread in the states, we can only expect the pressures 
from felony defendants on county jails to grow worse. In hard ecomonic times, and 
especially in places whose jails are already overcrowded, misdemeanor defendants 
are likely to be the beneficiaries. If defendants cannot be jailed and treatment 
programs diminish, fines will become the staple of punishment in the lbwer courts 
to a degree even greater than the current situation. This may not necessarily lead 
to much more revenue, however. Rather, difficulties in collection from poor and 
transient defendants may result (Hillsman et al., 1982). 
' --
Criminal court proceedings have often been likened to morality plays 
(Erikson, 1966; Bennett and Feldman, 1981). But we have found that the 
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proceedings are "played" before a backdrop of politics and economics, in which 
judicial discretion in sentencing will be increasingly curtailed. Appellate court 
decisions, legislative actions, and scarce budgetary resources are becoming major 
contributing factors to this process. Federal court decisions limit the use of 
overcrowded or unsafe jails, incarceration of defendants unable to pay fines, and 
incarceration of defendants without counsel. At the state level, legislators are 
becoming increasingly restive over the public outrage at drunk driving. The result 
probably will be tougher statutes that (like Ohio's) mandate incarceration-even if 
for a short period--of defendants convicted of drunk driving. Though charge 
reductions will always be potentially available to circumscribe legislative intent, 
this too may be more difficult to accompllsh under the glare of increased visibility. 
Finally, scarce budgetary resources at the federal, state, and local levels are likely 
to impair the use of treatment programs and other costly-to-administer sentencing 
options such as community work. In short, judges in the lower courts-for better or 
worse--will find it increasingly difficult to do what they would really like to do 
with the defendants who come before them. 
More generally, what is threatened is the quality of judicial independence, 
long revered as the hallmark of American justice. The Constitution's idea of 
separation of powers seems, with little doubt, violated by pressures upon the courts 
from legislative sources to raise more money and from executive sources to forego 
the professional, technical, and support staff needed to implement alternative 
sentencing options. Most judges in these courts believed this, as did some-but not 
all--other court participants. On the other hand, there may be only a fine line 
between judicial independence and judicial hegemony. Political theorists and 
commentators (Abraham, 1981) continue to argue that the legislature's "power of 
the purse" is one of its few effective checks against a wild or overbearing 
judiciary. Whether the courts should be treated at budget time like every other 
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agency or in a special category reflective of their status as a separate branch of 
government is a question being hotly debated in local communities these days. The 
lack of consensus on this issue among policy-makers only parallels the lack of 
consensus in the polity at large. 
Implications for Research 
Our findings and conclusions have implications for several bodies of research. 
For sentencing research, we would suggest a closer look at the variables comprising 
standard quantitative analyses. The research reported here strongly indicates that 
contextual factors qualify or alter the mea1 .i !'lg of variables. This is particularly 
true with respect to sanctions. For example, fines have typically been used to 
. . 
connote the economic penalty imposed upon convicted defendants. But we have 
found the increasing import of court costs, especially in Tacoma where they are 
often being used in lieu of fines. The meaning of probation is also changing, as 
departments move increasingly to unsupervised probation in the wake of personnel 
cutbacks. Jail terms, too, become ambiguous when there is no certainty, as in 
Tacoma, that they can or wi,ll be executed. These are but a few of many examples 
that emerge from our comparative field-based research. · For every effort we made 
to insure comparability from site to site in the meaning of key variables, we found 
disturbing loose ends that could not readily be tied together. Future research, even 
case-studies, should pay closer attention to what sentencing and related variables 
actually mean. In particular, qualitative methods should be used to supplement 
quantitative analyses wherever possible (see also Feeley, 1979; Mather, 1979). 
Much research has taken place during the past decade on the influence of 
legal versus extra-legal factors on sentencing. Those interested in extra-legal 
influences have examined such offender characteristics as age, race, gender, and 
socio-economic status to determine whether disparities in treatment existed 
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between classes of defendants. The research in this area has yielded some 
important findings, but not without much methodological debate (Spohn et al., 
1981). Thus, we think that some resources should be redirected toward the study of 
macro-level influences. Our research indicates that cross-community variations in 
sentencing are not well-explained either by differences in legal factors such as the 
type or seriousness of offense or differences in the demographic backgrounds of 
defendants. Rather, sentencing variations are responsive to environmental condi-
tions. The economy is but one of several possible areas of research, and ours is but 
a first look at economic factors. The potential for theoretical contributions to our 
understanding of justice seems much greater, at this point in time, by moving 
systematic empirical inquiry beyond the courtroom. 
Finally, our research may speak in a limited way to the community/political 
culture literatures of sociology and political science. Communities may not be so 
distinctive in their political cultures--in their values and attitudes about politics 
and public policies (like crime)--as previously supposed. It has been commonplace 
to attribute unexplained or peculiar differences in sentencing to the--usually 
unknown--normative climates of communities (see, e.g., Levin, 1977; Wheeler et 
al., 1982). But our research points, in a preliminary way, to consensual attitudes 
about crime and punishment across four communities quite disparate in their 
demography and geography. Attitudes about drunk driving, shoplifting, assault, and 
speeding are almost invariant from one community to another. 
Policy Implications 
Our research also has a range of policy implications. Rather than making 
specific policy recommendations about the operation of the lower criminal courts, 
we instead map out implications for several not-so-obvious policy areas. 
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The first concerns research and implementation of sentencing guidelines. In 
an effort to reduce wide judicial differences in sentencing at the felony level, 
formal quantitative guidelines were developed, tested, and implemented in several 
federal district courts (see Kress, 1980). The purpose of the guidelines was to 
establish a precise range of acceptable sentences for different categories of 
offenders and offenses. The sentences were developed from penological consider-
ations--rehabilitation, punishment and deterrence in some combination. Likewise, 
some states have recently begun to develop and implement guidelines for their 
felony, and occasionally, lower courts (see Criminal Courts Technical Assistance 
Project, 1980). Guidelmes serve a useful purpose in the sentencing process, even if 
their use is only voluntary or selective. But such guidelines will need to become 
increasingly sensitive to the implications of "economic realities," if they are to be 
at all realistic. Judges do not sentence defendants to jail or prison merely, as one 
put it, to "hear their vocal cords operate." Resource availability at the state and 
local levels will have to be factored into the equations that develop what kinds and 
how much of sentences will be imposed. In particular, input from sheriffs and 
corrections officials will be essential. 
A second area of policy implications focuses on the methods for court 
financing. As a response to reform pressures for the unification of state courts, 
local financing of courts has been urged to give way to state-level financing (see, 
e.g., Berkson and Carbon, 1978). Baar (1975:116-17) observed a small trend toward 
increased state financing of courts in the early 1970s. What would be the 
implications for political and economic considerations, if such a trend were to 
contlnue or accelerate? 
Many reformers regard locally-financed courts akin to political cesspools in 
which judicial independence is severely compromised. Shifting the budgetary 
battleground to the state level, however, would seem to do little more than shift 
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the arena--but not particularly the amount or intensity--of politics. In fact, we 
know sufficiently little about these political processes that only sheer speculation 
is possible. But we do know that state financing is no panacea for the woes of 
interest group pluralism or the complexities of federalism. Local county board 
members would lose control not only of expenditures (which they might gladly 
yield) but also of revenue. As one consequence, locales whose courts are effective 
at revenue-generating might find themselves helping to fund poor counties in other 
parts of their state, if some kind of per capita factor were to prevail in the state 
I 
allocation process. Indeed, the uncertainties of interest group politics at the state 
level are such that substantial resistance to state financing can be expected. Thus, 
local politics will continue to flourish in most states, where courts remain 
primarily financed from local treasuries. 
Concluding Note 
Our study of sentencing in four lower criminal courts accomplishes several 
important goals. It is the first comparative study of -what can accurately be called 
"America's most neglected courts" (President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and the Administration of Justice, 1967). The four courts we studied are quite 
different in many aspects of their sentencing practices. These differences--
identified in some detail--indicate the value of multi-site studies and, thus, the 
limitations of case studies. Another key goal was to expand the object of analysis 
beyond the confines of the courtroom or the courthouse •. We examine community 
influences--both political and economic--on the aggregate sentencing features of 
each court. Yet more remains to be done. Much of our research was necessarily 
exploratory and limited. We hope to lay some groundwork for future studies of 
lower criminal courts and to provide alternative directions for analyses of the 
adjudication and sentencing processes. 
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